The effect of events context on children\u27s recall of non-experienced events across mutiple interviews by Jones, Carolyn & Powell, Martine
Deakin Research Online 
Deakin University’s institutional research repository 
DDeakin Research Online  
Research Online  
This is the author’s final peer reviewed version of the item 
published as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jones, Carolyn and Powell, Martine 2005-02, Effect of events context on children's recall 
of non-experienced events across mutiple interviews, Legal and criminological 
psychology, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 83-101. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright : 2005, The British Psychological Society 
 
 
     
Non-Experienced Events 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect of event context on children‟s recall of non-experienced events across 
multiple interviews. 
 
 
 
Carolyn H. Jones  and  Martine B. Powell 
Deakin University 
 
 
Author notes: Thanks to the teachers, children, and parents at Dandenong North, 
Dandenong West, Yarraman, East Preston, West Preston, Heatherhill, Melbourne 
Girls Grammar, Lauriston and Xavier kindergartens and preschools. Thanks also to 
Katie Miles and Lisa Ellis for their assistance in carrying out the project and to Don 
Thomson for discussing some of the ideas presented in this paper. Requests for 
reprints should be addressed to Dr Martine Powell, School of Psychology, Deakin 
University, 221 Burwood Hwy, Burwood, 3125, Australia. Email: 
mbpowell@deakin.edu.au. 
Non-Experienced Events 2 
Abstract 
 
Purpose. The current study examined whether young children‟s willingness to assent to, 
and provide details about, a false (non-experienced) activity differs depending on whether 
the activity was allegedly embedded within (a) a specific event or (b) a broad (non-
specified) time frame. 
 
Method. Ninety-nine children aged 4 to 5 years (from both low and high socio-economic 
backgrounds) either (a) participated in a staged event that consisted of two activities or (b) 
did not participate in any staged event. One or two days later, all children were given false 
suggestions about a non-experienced (false) activity that had either high or low 
plausibility. Approximately 8, 15, and 22 days after the event, children were asked to 
recall the activities, and to answer a series of specific cued-recall questions. 
 
Results. There was no effect of event context on assent rates and the rate at which children 
reported interviewer suggestions. However, children who participated in the staged event 
provided fewer details about the false activity. Further, among those children who 
assented to the false activity, fewer subjects, objects, actions, temporal markers, locations, 
fantastic/improbable details and confabulation errors were reported when the activity was 
embedded within the specific staged event.  
 
Conclusion. The degree of error in children‟s accounts of a completely false activity is 
reduced when the activity is suggested to have occurred within a specified event as 
opposed to a broad (non-specified) time frame.  
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The effect of event context on children‟s recall of non-experienced events across 
multiple interviews. 
The factors that affect young children‟s suggestibility has been one of the 
most prominent areas of interest among the child eyewitness memory researchers to 
date. Suggestibility generally refers to errors that arise in response to false 
(misleading) information provided by an interviewer or in response to social 
pressures to provide particular answers (Poole & Lamb, 1998). Prior research has 
shown that the degree of children‟s suggestibility varies according to the child‟s age. 
Preschoolers (i.e., 4- to 5-year-old children) are the most vulnerable to interviewer 
suggestion (Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Further, children‟s suggestibility varies depending 
on the timing of the interview, the characteristics of the interviewer, individual 
factors associated with the child, the type of questions asked, and the number of 
interviews (see Ceci, Powell, & Principe, 2002, for review). One limitation of the 
large body of previous work, however, is that it has focused almost entirely on 
children‟s recall of experienced events. Researchers have typically adopted 
paradigms where children are exposed to a staged event in their school and are (a) 
subsequently presented with errant details about the event and are then asked to recall 
what happened in the event, or (b) are asked misleading questions about the event. 
The boundaries of young children‟s suggestibility in relation to non-experienced (i.e., 
completely false) events has received less attention among researchers.  
Of all the studies that have examined children‟s recall of completely false 
(non-experienced) events (Bruck, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 2002; Ceci, Crotteau-
Huffman, Smith, & Loftus, 1994a; Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994b; Pezdek 
& Hodge, 1999; Powell, Jones, & Campbell, 2003; Quas, Goodman, Bidrose, Pipe, 
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Craw, & Ablin, 1999; Quas & Schaaf, 2002), all but one (i.e., Pezdek & Hodge, 
1999) have focused on preschoolers. Taken together, these studies have shown that 
when an interviewer suggests that a false (non-experienced) event occurred, children 
can be led to assent to that event. Further, of those children who do assent, they can 
be led (over repeated interviews using a combination of highly suggestive interview 
techniques) to provide elaborate accounts of false events that are highly similar in 
content and structure to reports about true (experienced) events. For example, in the 
study by Bruck et al. (2002) sixteen children aged 3 to 5 years were interviewed 
approximately once a week for five weeks about four events. The events included (i) 
a true positive event where the child helped a lady who had fallen down at the school, 
(ii) a true negative event (supplied by the parent) where the child had been punished 
for a misdeed, (iii) a false positive event where the child allegedly helped a lady find 
a lost monkey in a park, and (iv) a false negative event where the child allegedly 
witnessed a man steal food from the preschool. While the first interview was limited 
to non-suggestive, open-ended questions, the second and third interviews 
incorporated repeated misinformation and leading questions, peer pressure (e.g., “All 
the other kids told me they helped a lady in the park”), guided imagery (i.e., telling 
the child to pretend or imagine that the event happened and to think about the details), 
and selective reinforcement (e.g., “It‟s so wonderful that there are nice kids like you 
to help people when they need it”). The remaining interviews contained no 
misinformation, but did incorporate the other suggestive techniques listed above. 
The results of Bruck et al.‟s (2002) study revealed that in the initial interview, 
the majority of children denied the two false events. However, assent rates increased 
so that by the third interview, there was no significant difference in the assent rates 
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across both the true and false events and the positive and negative events. Further, 
children provided more detailed and elaborate narratives for the false events than the 
true events, although the total details reported about each event did not tend to change 
across the interviews. Specifically, the false events included more fantastic and 
improbable details (e.g., „the monkey died‟, „Suzanne kicked the bad guy in the 
legs‟), more temporal markers (e.g., „then‟, „after‟, „sometimes‟, „usually‟) and more 
elaborations (e.g., adjectives, adverbs and metaphorical terms). While the positive 
false event in Bruck et al.‟s study was relatively implausible, their findings have been 
replicated using positive non-experienced activities that are highly plausible (i.e., 
listening to a story, interacting with a  puppet, receiving a surprise sticker, Powell et 
al., 2003). 
Prior research has also demonstrated that while young children can provide 
reports of false (non-experienced) events, the likelihood that they will assent to a 
false event and the degree of error in the child‟s account of the event is influenced by 
several factors. First, a positive relationship has been found between the age of the 
child and the child‟s willingness to assent to a non-experienced activity or event, with 
younger children assenting more often than older children (Quas et al., 1999; Quas & 
Schaaf, 2002). Second, research has shown that children are more likely to assent to, 
or report details about, a plausible false event (i.e., being lost in a shopping mall) than 
an implausible false event (i.e., having a rectal enema; Pezdek & Hodge, 1999). 
Third, Quas and Shaaf (2002) showed that false suggestions that an activity occurred 
(e.g., telling a child that they were touched by a man while they played) are more 
likely to be rejected if the activity depends on other details that the child knows are 
not true (e.g., when there was no man present in the room when the child played). 
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Fourth, Powell et al. (2003) showed that children from high socio-economic 
backgrounds are more resistant to interviewer suggestion about a non-experienced 
event than children from low socio-economic backgrounds. Importantly, these factors 
found to impact children‟s suggestibility for false (non-experienced) events have been 
consistent with the literature on children‟s memory of experienced, falsely biased 
events (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; McFarlane, Powell, & Dudgeon, 2002; Pezdek & Roe, 
1997). Indeed, with regard to age and socio-economic status, these factors have been 
found to predict error rates (over and above the impact of intelligence) using standard 
suggestibility paradigms (McFarlane et al., 2002). Therefore, the two major 
contributions of previous work has been to demonstrate that (a) young children‟s 
willingness to report details about false events after multiple highly suggestive 
interviews is a relatively robust finding, and (b) many of the factors that influence 
children‟s suggestibility for experienced events are generalisable to false, non-
experienced events.  
One important issue, however, that has not yet been investigated in relation to 
young children‟s memory of false events is the context of the event. Specifically, 
does the nature and degree of error in children‟s reports of false events differ 
depending on whether the false event had allegedly been part of (or embedded in) a 
specific sequence of activities that was remembered to have occurred. While 
numerous studies have established that young children assent to false acts (Quas & 
Schaaf, 2002) and they even provide narrative accounts of entirely false activities that 
were embedded within an experienced event (Powell et al., 2003), no study to date 
has directly examined the effect of event context on the rate of various errors.  
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The importance of examining the effect of event context is heightened by the 
fact that previous research on children‟s narrative accounts of false events has 
differed in terms of whether the false event was embedded within an experienced 
event. Previous work has also differed in terms of the degree to which the children 
were suggestible. For instance, the false events in Bruck et al.‟s study (2002) 
involved a person merely referred to as a „lady‟ or „man‟ (presumably not previously 
known to the children). In contrast, the false events in Powell et al.‟s (2003) study 
allegedly occurred with a lady who was known to the children and who did 
participate in other activities with them that were well remembered. While the 
children in both studies did provide narrative accounts of the false activities, the 
number of details reported by the children (particularly fantastic and improbable
1
 
details), did seem higher in Bruck et al.‟s study than that of Powell et al. (M 
fantastic/improbable details = 1.85 and 0.55 for each study respectively). Thus, an 
examination of the effect of context on suggestibility may help to explain differences 
in the degree of suggestibility across previous studies.  
The current study was designed to extend previous research by examining 
further the conditions that make young children more or less suggestible in relation to 
non-experienced events. Specifically, the study investigated whether young children‟s 
willingness to assent to, and provide details about, a false (non-experienced) event 
differs depending on whether the false event was allegedly embedded within an event 
that was remembered to have occurred. Fifty children (aged 4 to 5 years) from both 
low and high socio-economic backgrounds participated in a staged event that 
                                                          
1 Fantastic/improbable details refer to details that are outlandish or implausible (e.g., „I rode on the 
polar bear‟s back to catch the monkey‟) or contain aggressive or harmful content (e.g., „The monkey 
died‟). 
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consisted of two distinct activities. Another group of 49 children (matched for age 
and socio-economic status) did not participate in any activity. One or two days later, 
the former children were given false suggestions about a non-experienced activity 
that was suggested to have occurred during the staged event. The latter children were 
given suggestions about a non-experienced activity that was allegedly carried out 
during a non-specified day at the child‟s preschool. Within each of these conditions, 
the suggested (false) activity was either plausible or implausible
2
. Approximately 8, 
15, and 22 days after the event, the children were asked to recall each of the activities 
in their own words, and to answer a series of specific questions about details that had 
been falsely suggested. 
Overall we expected that the children who participated in the staged event 
would be less likely to assent to the false activity and they would report fewer details 
about the false activity within each of the interviews. Prior research using a similar 
event has revealed that the experienced activities in this study would have been well 
remembered at the one-to-two day retention interval (see Powell et al., 2003). 
Therefore, the children who experienced these activities would have a relatively clear 
and narrow contextual framework within which to judge the feasibility of the false 
suggested activity. In contrast, the children who did not participate in the staged event 
would be judging the feasibility of the false activity within a relatively broad or 
general contextual framework (i.e., my experiences at preschool). According to 
schema theory, the more generalised the event representation, the easier it would be 
to integrate or accept the false activity, provided that the false activity was consistent 
                                                          
2 The terms plausible and implausible are used merely for ease of expression. It would be more 
appropriate to consider that the activities differed according to degree of plausibility (i.e., high vs. low 
plausibility). 
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with what typically occurred in the event (Hudson, Fivush, & Kuebli, 1992). The 
more established representation of school would also provide a larger pool of 
knowledge to reconstruct the false activity. Similarly, source confusion theories 
would predict a higher rate of errors when the false activity was embedded within a 
broad framework. The broader and less defined contextual framework would decrease 
the distinctiveness of the false suggested activity, thereby decreasing the children‟s 
confidence and accuracy in rejecting the interviewer‟s suggestions (Roberts, 2000). 
Further, the large number of varied experiences associated with preschool would 
increase the risk that the children would confuse the false suggested activity with 
other similar school experiences (Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999). In 
light of these arguments, it is feasible that any difference in error rates between the 
event conditions would be minimised for the implausible compared to the plausible 
false activity. While children have been shown to be less suggestible for implausible 
than plausible false events (Pezdek & Hodge, 1999), the implausible false activity 
would be easily distinguished from most other school experiences, and it would be 
viewed as relatively inconsistent with the event representation irrespective of how 
specific it was. 
In relation to the other variables included in the current study, we expected 
main effects in line with the results of previous research. First, we predicted that 
assent rates would increase from the first (biasing) interview to the second interview 
and the overall number of details provided in children’s false reports would increase 
across the three memory interviews (see Powell et al., 2003). Second, we expected 
that children from high socio-economic backgrounds would be less suggestible than 
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children from low socio-economic backgrounds (Powell et al., 2003). However, there 
was no basis to expect that any of these variables would interact with event context. 
Method 
Design 
Half of the children participated in an event called the „Deakin Activities‟ that 
consisted of two activities. Either one or two days after the event, the children were 
asked to describe each of the activities in their own words as well as an activity they 
had not experienced in the event. Half of these children were asked to describe a 
plausible false activity whereas the other half described an implausible activity. All 
children were then given a biasing interview that included false details about (a) one 
of the two experienced activities and (b) the non-experienced (false) activity. They 
were again interviewed approximately 8, 15, and 22 days after the event and asked to 
recall each of the activities in their own words, and in response to specific cued-recall 
questions. The remaining half of the children did not participate in the Deakin 
Activities. However, their biasing and memory interviews focused entirely on the 
false (non-experienced) activity. The design employed was a 3 (Interview order; 
second, third, fourth) x 2 (Socio-economic status; low vs. high) x 2 (Plausibility of 
activity; plausible vs. implausible) x 2 (Context of activity; embedded within the 
Deakin Activities vs. any time at preschool). Interview order was a within-subjects 
factor and all other factors were manipulated between-subjects. 
Participants 
Children were recruited through letters to parents that were distributed in nine 
Melbourne metropolitan preschools. Three of the preschools were classified as 
representing families of relatively high income (these preschools demanded high fees 
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and were attached to reputable private elementary schools). The remaining preschools 
were based in a low SES area according to ratings provided by the Department of 
Human Services. The initial sample included 128 children, however 29 children were 
excluded because they did not attend one of the interviews. The final participant pool 
consisted of 99 children (39 males, 60 females; M age = 56 months; SD =3.76, age 
range = 3 years, 11 months to 5 years, 4 months). These children were assigned to the 
experimental conditions on a rotational basis with the constraint that each Plausibility 
of activity x Context of activity cell was equated for age (in months), gender and 
socio-economic status. All children who were granted parental consent to participate 
were included in the study provided they had no significant language or learning 
difficulties (as determined by the regular teacher). No children who were granted 
consent to partake in the study had any major language or learning difficulties.  
Materials 
Each false and experienced activity consisted of 10 critical items (these were 
administered and/or probed in the same temporal order). For event condition, six 
possible false activities (3 plausible, 3 implausible) and associated critical items were 
created
3
. An equal number of children were assigned to each of these activities. Table 
1 presents the six activities and the critical items that were associated with each 
activity. Note that the assignment of items that were suggested was also 
counterbalanced. For half of each of the Plausibility of activity x Context of activity 
groups, the false suggestions were the even numbered items in Table 1 whereas for 
the other half, the false suggested items were the odd numbered items. 
                                                          
3 All teachers confirmed that the children had not participated in any of the specific false activities that 
were utilised in this project. 
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_______________ 
Insert Table 1 here 
_______________ 
Procedure
4
 
The event. The two experienced activities (referred to as the „Deakin 
Activities‟) were administered by a research assistant in the children‟s regular 
classroom. When introducing the event, the assistant explained, “I‟ve called it the 
Deakin Activities because some people at a place called Deakin University helped me 
to get to all the things ready for what we are going to do today.” The event took 
approximately 25 minutes to administer and consisted of two of the three scripted 
activities listed in Table 1 (i.e., elephant story, interaction with the koala puppet, 
surprise sticker) which were assigned in accordance with the counterbalancing 
procedure described earlier. Teachers were instructed not to discuss the activities or 
to inform the children that they would later be interviewed about the activities.  
The interviews. Each child individually attended four interview sessions held 
approximately 1-2, 8, 15, and 22 days after the event. Each interview took 
approximately 10-15 minutes to complete and was conducted by a different person to 
that who conducted the event. In the initial interview, the interviewer began by 
eliciting the children‟s free-narrative account of the activity/activities. The children 
who participated in the Deakin Activities were asked to recall everything that 
happened in the two experienced activities and the non-experienced (false) activity 
(in counterbalanced order), e.g., “I heard that you did the Deakin Activities with a 
lady called Lisa the other day. I heard that you got a story about an elephant that 
                                                          
4 The procedure used in the current study was similar to that used by Powell et al. (2003). 
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wanted to get married, you met the special friend the koala puppet, and you got a 
surprise sticker. First, tell me everything that happened in the story about the elephant 
that wanted to get married.” (Note that the interviewer did not know which activity 
represented the true-unbiased, true-biased, and false activity for each child). The 
remaining children were asked to report generally about things that had been 
happening at school and then to recall the false activity, e.g., “I heard that a lady 
called Lisa came to your preschool and read the whole class a story about an elephant 
that wanted to get married. Tell me everything that happened in that story.” A 
standard list of open-ended prompts were used to elicit the children‟s free-narrative 
account of the activities (i.e., “Tell me everything that happened?”, “What happened 
next?”, “What else can you tell me about?”). A standard combination of suggestive 
techniques based on those employed by Bruck et al. (2002) were also used to 
encourage the children to provide elaborate information
5
. These techniques included 
peer conformity (e.g., “Some other children told me that you met the special friend 
the koala”), positive reinforcement (e.g., “You're doing so well at answering my 
questions”), negative reinforcement (e.g., “That's a shame you can't remember, 
because I really need to know what happened”), and appeal (e.g., “I really need your 
help answering these questions”). 
Once the child‟s free-narrative account of the event was exhausted, each child 
was then asked a series of specific questions. These questions were asked irrespective 
of whether or not the child had assented to the activity previously. In the initial 
interview, children who had participated in the Deakin Activities were asked a series 
                                                          
5 A detailed set of standard rules was developed to ensure that the interviewer‟s questioning and degree 
of coercion was consistent across the conditions. These rules can be provided on request. 
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of 17 specific questions at the end of their narrative accounts. The purpose of these 
was to present false biasing information. Ten of the questions related to the true-
biased activity; half of these suggested false details and half suggested true details. 
For example, if the child had met Boo the koala in the event, the corresponding false 
suggestion would have been “I heard you met a koala in the Deakin activities. Tell 
me what Kip the koala looked like?” A corresponding true suggestion would have 
been “Tell me what Boo the koala looked like?” Presuppositional questions of this 
nature have successfully been used to show reliable suggestibility effects using a 
similar event (e.g., Powell et al., 1999).  
The remaining seven specific questions corresponded to the false (non-
experienced) activity. Five of these questions suggested false details about the 
activity. For example, if the false activity was the elephant story, the children may 
have been asked, “I heard the elephant got married in a hot air balloon. That‟s a funny 
place to get married. Did any of his friends come to the wedding?” The remaining 
two of the questions were general questions about the event (e.g., “Where were you 
when you did the Deakin Activities?”, and “What did Lisa bring with her that she 
stuck up on the wall?”). These two filler questions were interspersed among the other 
five questions about the false activity so that the children could answer both true and 
false questions in association with the false activity. While the order in which the 
true-biased and false activities were discussed was counterbalanced, the specific 
questions within each activity were asked in a standard order, with the filler questions 
for the false activity being asked second and fifth in the sequence. The children who 
did not participate in the Deakin Activities were asked seven questions regarding the 
false (non-experienced) activity as described above. The two filler questions asked 
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were general questions about preschool (e.g., “What is your teacher's name?”, 
“Where do you eat your snack?”). 
The remaining three interviews were the same as the initial interview except 
that for the children who did not experience the Deakin Activities, there was no brief 
introductory discussion about what had been happening in school. Further, for all 
children, no biasing information was presented. The children who participated in the 
Deakin Activities were asked five specific cued-recall questions for each of the true 
and false activities. For example, “Where did the elephant get married?” For the true-
biased and false activities, the questions related to the details that had been falsely 
biased. For example, if children had been provided with the false suggestion that the 
koala‟s name was Kip, a corresponding specific cued-recall question would have 
been “What was the koala‟s name?” Children who did not participate in the Deakin 
Activities were asked five specific cued-recall questions relating to the false activity 
only.  
Coding 
The children‟s responses were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim for 
coding. The coding procedure for each interview was the same (note that the specific 
questions in Interview 1 were not coded as their purpose was merely to provide 
biasing information). 
Assents. It was firstly determined whether or not the children had assented to 
each of the false activities in response to the open-ended questions. A child was 
judged to have assented to an activity if (s)he provided at least one detail about the 
activity as if it had happened. The child was not judged to have assented if (s)he 
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merely repeated the interviewer‟s question (or part thereof) in the form of a 
statement. 
Responses to open-ended and specific cued-recall questions. All relevant 
responses to the specific cued-recall questions were coded as correct or incorrect 
(note that relevant responses could only be regarded as incorrect for the false 
activities). Each detail provided in the children‟s narrative descriptions of the 
activities (i.e., in response to the open-ended questions) were coded as correct or 
incorrect (again, note that responses could only be coded as incorrect in relation to 
the false activities). All details provided in relation to the false activities were then 
assigned to one of the following error categories; (i) Interviewer suggestion when the 
child restated an inaccurate detail that was previously provided by the interviewer, 
(ii) Brought from another activity when the child‟s answer referred to a detail that 
was experienced in another (true) activity (e.g., stating that the koala puppet got 
married when it was the elephant in the story that got married), and (iii) 
Confabulations when the child provided a detail that was not mentioned by the 
interviewer and was not included in any of the Deakin Activities. 
Nature of information reported. Details provided in relation to the false 
activities were also classified (where appropriate) as actions, objects, or subjects. For 
example, if a child said; “the koala fell off a tree and broke his arm”, (s)he was given 
the subject koala, the action fell off, the object tree, the action broke, the subject his 
and the object arm. In addition, elaborative details were coded and were divided into 
the following categories established by Bruck et al. (2002); (i) temporal markers 
which included words referring to chronological time (e.g., then, after, first, next, 
last), causal relations (e.g., because, so, in order to) and optional states (e.g., 
Non-Experienced Events 17 
sometimes, usually, always, or, probably), (ii) descriptive information which included 
adjectives or adverbs used to describe actions, objects and subjects (e.g., “we ran 
fast”, “blue sticker”), (iii) dialogue statements which included any reference to 
dialogue (e.g., “she said...”), (iv) references to location (e.g., on, under, in, inside, 
where) and (v) fantastic/improbable details which included any details that were 
outlandish or implausible (e.g., “The whale was down the drainpipe”) or contained 
one of the following aggressive themes: hurting or being hurt, and breaking things 
(e.g., “The koala smashed through windows”), and (vi) contradictions which referred 
to details mentioned in the third or fourth interview that contradicted details 
mentioned in a previous interview (e.g., if a child reported in the second interview 
that “the elephant married the hippopotamus” and in the third interview reported that 
“the elephant married the crocodile”).  
All transcripts were coded by one researcher and 10% of these were also 
coded by a second researcher who was not otherwise involved in the study. Interrater 
reliability calculated as agreements/ (agreements + disagreements) was 100 % for 
assents, 91% for narrative details provided in response to open-ended questions, and 
98% for the specific cued-recall questions. Discrepancies were resolved and the codes 
assigned by the principal coder were used in all analyses. 
Results 
As the purpose of this study was to compare the children‟s reports of the false 
activities across the event conditions, differences in responses across the true-
unbiased, true-biased and false activities for the children who participated in the 
Deakin Activities were not examined. However, it is important to note that for the 
children who experienced the staged event, the two (true) activities were well 
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remembered. The mean number of correct narrative details recalled across the 
interviews for the true-unbiased and true-biased activities was 20.34 and 18.30 for 
each respective activity. 
Given the number of analyses performed, the more conservative p value of .01 
was used for the omnibus analyses (p value for planned comparisons is .05). All the 
analyses reported were initially performed with socio-economic status and then with 
gender of the child included as between-subjects factors. There were no effects of 
gender or socio-economic status. Therefore, for ease of presentation, all analyses 
have been reported collapsed over these factors. Further, all analyses on the number 
or proportion of incorrect details were initially performed with the children who did 
not assent to the false activity at any of the interviews included. However, few 
differences in results were found, therefore all analyses on the number or proportion 
of incorrect details have been reported with the children who did not assent to the 
false activity at any of the interviews excluded. Qualifications in interpretation have 
been made (where appropriate) when results across these two sets of analyses were 
not consistent. 
Assents 
Table 2 displays the number and frequency of children who assented to the 
false activity (i.e., provided a detail as if the activity had occurred) across the event 
conditions and interviews. A series of chi-square tests (one at each interview) were 
conducted to find out whether the rate of assent differed according to whether the 
false activity was embedded within the staged event called the „Deakin Activities‟. 
There were no significant differences in assent rates at any of the interviews, 2 (1) = 
0.01 – 0.30. Next, a series of chi-square tests were performed to compare assent rates 
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for the plausible and implausible false activities at each interview. There were no 
significant differences in assent rates at any of the interviews, 2 (1) = 0.02 – 0.90. 
However, it should be noted that the non-significant results were not due to a floor 
effect with regard to children resisting assenting to the false activities. Thirteen (26%) 
children who experienced the Deakin Activities and 15 (31%) of the remaining 
children did not assent to the false activity at any of the interviews. 
_______________ 
Insert Table 2 here 
_______________ 
The number of details reported 
Table 3 displays the mean number of details reported about the false activities 
across the event conditions, questions and interviews. A 3 (Interview order
6
; second, 
third, fourth) x 2 (Plausibility of activity; plausible vs. implausible) x 2 (Context of 
activity; embedded within the Deakin Activities vs. any time at preschool) ANCOVA 
was performed on the number of details reported in response to each question type. 
Interview was a within-subjects factor, plausibility and context were manipulated 
between-subjects, and age in months was the covariate. For the open-ended questions, 
there was one finding; a main effect of Context of activity, F(1, 66) = 14.33, p < 
0.001. Children who did not experience any staged event reported a greater number 
of details (M = 37.29, SD = 24.11) than those children for whom the false activity 
was embedded within the „Deakin Activities‟ event (M = 18.89, SD = 17.23). For the 
                                                          
6 Details reported in the first interview were not included because biasing information had not yet been 
provided. Therefore it was not yet possible to observe the effect of interviewer suggestions which was 
a central focus of this study. 
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specific cued-recall questions, there were no main effects or interactions, F‟s 0.03 – 
1.19. 
_______________ 
Insert Table 3 here 
_______________ 
The nature of information reported 
Table 4 presents the mean number of details reported for each separate 
sentence-unit (i.e., subjects, objects, actions, temporal details, descriptives, dialogue, 
locations, fantastic/improbable details and contradictions) across the event conditions 
and interviews. A series of 3 (Interview order; second, third, fourth) x 2 (Plausibility 
of activity; plausible vs. implausible) x 2 (Context of activity; embedded within the 
Deakin Activities vs. any time at preschool) ANCOVAs were performed on each of 
the first eight categories listed above with age in months as a covariate. No analyses 
were performed on the contradictions because these responses were consistently near 
floor. 
_______________ 
Insert Table 4 here 
_______________ 
For the analyses on the number of subjects, F(1, 66) = 14.70, p < .001, 
objects, F(1, 66) = 12.09, p = .001, actions, F(1, 66) = 10.46, p = .002, temporal 
markers, F(1, 66) = 7.33, p = .009, location details, F(1, 66) = 8.00, p = .006, and 
fantastic/improbable details, F(1,66) = 6.07, p = .016, there were main effects 
involving Context of activity. These revealed that children who did not experience 
any staged event reported more of these sentence-units than the remaining children. 
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There were no other significant findings involving any of the variables, F‟s = 0.04 – 
4.49. Caution should be exercised, however, in interpreting the effect of Context of 
activity on the number of temporal markers, location details and fantastic/improbable 
details reported. When children who did not assent at any of the interviews were 
included in the analyses, there were no main effects involving Context of activity. 
The types of errors reported 
Three types of errors were reported by the children for false activities. These 
included (i) confabulations; details that were not mentioned by the interviewer and/or 
were not included in the Deakin Activities, (ii) reporting of interviewer suggestions, 
and (iii) details brought from another experienced activity (for children who 
experienced the staged event only). Table 5 displays the proportion of errors that 
were made in each of these categories across the event conditions, questions and 
interviews. As can be seen in Table 5, the majority of errors reported by all children 
(irrespective of the condition) were confabulations. 
_______________ 
Insert Table 5 here 
_______________ 
A series of 3 (Interview order; second, third, fourth) x 2 (Plausibility of 
activity; plausible vs. implausible) x 2 (Context of activity; embedded within the 
Deakin Activities vs. any time at preschool) ANCOVAs were performed on the first 
two error categories (with age in months as a covariate) for each question type. 
Across each of the four analyses there was only one significant finding; a main effect 
of Context of activity on the proportion of confabulation errors reported in response 
to open-ended questions, F(1, 66) = 7.63, p < .01. This effect indicated that the 
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children who experienced the „Deakin Activities‟ reported a lower proportion of 
confabulation errors (M = 0.64, SD = 0.32) than the remaining children (M = 0.82, 
SD = 0.22). Finally, for those children who participated in the staged event, a series 
of 3 (Interview order) x 2 (Plausibility of activity) ANCOVAs with age in months as 
a covariate were performed on the proportion of errors that were brought from 
another activity across each question type. There was no main effect or interactions 
involving any of the factors, F‟s 0.13 – 2.32. 
Discussion 
This study investigated whether young children‟s willingness to assent to, and 
provide details about, a completely false (non-experienced) activity under highly 
suggestive conditions differs depending on whether the false activity was alleged to 
have been embedded within a specific staged event (i.e., the „Deakin Activities‟) that 
contained other well-remembered activities. First, we expected that when the false 
activity was alleged to have occurred within a narrow-framework (the Deakin 
Activities), children would be less likely to assent to the false activity at each 
interview, particularly for the plausible activity. The results did not support this 
prediction as there was no effect of event context on assent rates. Second, for those 
children who did provide an account of the false activity, we expected fewer overall 
details and greater resistance to interviewer suggestions, particularly for the plausible 
activity. While there was no significant interaction between plausibility and event 
context, the results revealed partial support for a reduction in suggestibility when the 
false activity was embedded within the specific contextual framework. Reports of the 
children who experienced the staged event contained fewer overall details compared 
to those in the broad-framework condition. Further, among those children who 
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assented to the false activity at any of the interviews, the children who experienced 
the staged event reported fewer subjects, objects, actions, temporal markers, 
locations, and fantastic/improbable details.  
The benefits associated with having the false activity embedded within a 
specific (narrow) contextual framework were revealed after controlling for age in 
months. Further, they remained consistent across the repeated interviews, the 
participant groups (which varied according to high vs. low socio-economic status) 
and the plausible and implausible activities. The stability of the reduced suggestibility 
effect in the staged event condition also needs to be considered in relation to the high 
level of coercion used and the fact that the interviewer in this condition would have 
appeared very knowledgeable about the event. She had provided numerous correct 
details about the event (i.e., the two experienced activities) as well as false details.  
So why would susceptibility to interviewer suggestion be heightened when the 
activity allegedly occurred within the specific or narrow contextual framework? 
While the results partially supported our initial hypotheses, the pattern of findings in 
relation to assents and the types of errors reported are not consistent with the 
rationales we initially offered for hypothesising a lower rate of suggestibility in the 
narrow-framework condition. We expected that the broader contextual framework for 
preschool as opposed to the „Deakin Activities‟ event would increase the likelihood 
that the false activity would be integrated into the existing schematic representation 
(Hudson et al., 1992). Alternatively, the many varied experiences or activities 
associated with preschool would decrease the children‟s ability to discriminate 
between the false suggested activity and similar preschool activities (Powell et al., 
1999). However, if the findings were solely due to contextual factors, one would 
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expect that the beneficial effect of having the activity embedded within the specific 
„Deakin Activities‟ event would occur across both question types (open-ended and 
specific cued-recall questions) and measures of suggestibility (assent rates and 
number of narrative details). Further, one would expect a lower reliance on the 
interviewer suggestions among the children who experienced the staged event 
compared to the remaining children when reporting the false activity and this did not 
occur. For both the open-ended and specific cued-recall questions there was no 
difference in the rate in which the children relied on interviewer suggestions to 
reconstruct the activity. Indeed, irrespective of the event condition, question type or 
interview order, all children tended to rely largely on their existing experiences 
and/or imagination when reconstructing the activity. While there was a lower rate of 
confabulation errors among the children who experienced the staged event (i.e., the 
„Deakin Activities‟) for the open-ended questions, this would have been due to the 
fact that these children could draw on details that had occurred in the other 
experienced activities (these were coded separately to confabulations). 
When considering the overall pattern of findings, it is possible that the fewer 
details in the children‟s narrative reports of the false activity in the staged event 
condition are due (at least in part) to social-demand rather than cognitive factors. The 
children who experienced the staged event may have been less pressured to report 
false details because the interviewer asked them about the two activities they 
experienced in addition to the false activity. In other words, the interview was not 
entirely focused on the false activity; the children could contribute to the interview 
and be a cooperative conservation partner even if they provided no information at all 
about the false activity. This explanation is consistent with the children‟s behavioural 
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responses. Children in the broad-framework condition appeared to act out more when 
recalling the false activity (e.g., they walked around the room, tried to divert the topic 
of conversation, pulled funny faces). These are signs that the children might have felt 
more awkward or pressured to respond. A replication of the current study but without 
the request to report the true activities in the staged event would be needed to confirm 
this explanation.  
Another unexpected finding of this study was the absence of any effect 
involving plausibility of event. We hypothesised lower suggestibility for the plausible 
compared to implausible activity and an interaction between plausibility of activity 
and event context such that any difference in error rates between the event conditions 
would be minimised for the implausible compared to the plausible false activity. One 
possible explanation for the null finding is that the children in our study (aged 4 to 5 
years) lacked the cognitive capacity necessary to differentiate between the plausible 
and implausible activities. While Pezdek and Hodge (1999) revealed lower 
suggestibility for an implausible compared to a plausible false activity, their study 
used older children (i.e., 5-7 year-olds). This interpretation would explain the trend 
for the greater number of details being reported in the implausible false activity and is 
consistent with the findings of Lee, Cameron, Doucette, and Talwar (2002). In their 
study, children aged 3 to 6 years were told an implausible statement about a misdeed 
(i.e., that a ghost or a chair jumped out of a book and broke a glass). They were then 
asked a series of questions related to this misdeed (e.g., who they think performed it, 
whether they believe ghosts are real). The findings of Lee et al. illustrated that 
children below the age of 5 years have difficulty distinguishing between what is real 
and believable and what is fantastical and unbelievable. If all the false activities used 
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in the current study were equally believable, the children‟s responses might have 
been dictated by how much the suggested activities appealed to their sense of fun and 
imaginations. It may be that the implausible activities provided greater attraction in 
this respect. Further research could investigate this explanation by measuring the 
effect of a range of different false activities that vary in terms of their intrinsic appeal 
to young children, while controlling for other important factors.  
Finally, two other variables included in the current study were expected to 
influence the degree of children‟s suggestibility when recalling the false activity. 
First, in line with the results of Powell et al. (2003) who used a similar research 
design as that in this study, we expected an increase in assent rates from the first 
(biasing) interview to the second interview and that the overall number of details 
provided in the children‟s reports of the false activity would increase across the three 
memory (i.e., second to fourth) interviews. Further we expected a negative 
relationship between socio-economic status and children‟s suggestibility. While the 
finding involving assent rates was replicated, this study revealed no change in the 
overall number of details reported across the memory interviews and no effects 
involving SES. With regard to number of details reported, the inconsistency may be 
due to the fact that we utilised longer retention intervals compared to the Powell et al. 
study (i.e., the memory interviews occurred approximately 8, 15 and 22 days after the 
event as opposed to 3 and 8 days). Longer retention intervals would decrease the 
likelihood that the children would remember prior responses and interviewer 
suggestions. With regard to socio-economic status, the null finding needs to be 
considered in relation to the reduced sample size compared to previous work.  
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Overall, the findings of this study have highlighted several important issues 
for future researchers to consider. First, this study suggests that differences in the 
paradigms used to measure suggestibility for non-experienced (false) events may 
explain (at least in part) differences in the degree of suggestibility observed among 
children across previous studies (Bruck et al., 2002; Powell et al., 2003). Most 
research to date on children‟s memory of non-experienced events has involved a 
paradigm where the event being recalled was not embedded with other experienced 
activities. The current study suggests that this paradigm may be inflating 
suggestibility scores as well as the rate of fantastical/improbable details. Second, this 
study suggests that some of the mechanisms underlying older children‟s reporting of 
non-experienced events may not be applicable to younger (i.e., preschool aged) 
samples. Most studies to date have focused on preschoolers because these children 
are the most suggestible age group. However, it may be more fruitful for researchers 
to focus on older age groups as well as preschoolers because interpretation of the 
younger children‟s responses obviously requires consideration of the broad 
developmental framework. 
The current findings are relevant to legal practitioners and investigative 
interviewers because it is possible that children may be required to recall events that 
never occurred. Consistent with previous work (Bruck et al., 2002; Powell et al., 
2003), this study has shown that after repeated coercive interviews and the provision 
of false interviewer suggestions, preschool children can be led to provide narrative 
reports of false (non-experienced) activities. It is questionable whether the types of 
highly suggestive and coercive interviewing techniques used in the present study are 
widely used in the field. Evidence to date suggests that investigative interviewers use 
Non-Experienced Events 28 
a high proportion of specific or focused questions, yet they use few 
leading/misleading questions and other suggestive techniques (Powell, 2002). 
Nevertheless, children who testify may be interviewed by a range of persons (e.g., 
parents, teachers, peers), some of whom may not be appropriately trained to avoid 
suggestive techniques (Ceci & Bruck, 1995). Recent research has shown that parents 
and caregivers do use a relatively high proportion of suggestive interview strategies 
(compared to investigative interviewers) when eliciting information from their 
children about events (Agnew & Powell, 2003). The main conclusion to be drawn 
from the current study is that the risk that a child will be coached to report a 
completely false act of abuse may be reduced when the abuse was allegedly 
embedded within a specific event involving other well-remembered activities. 
Finally, it is important to note that even under highly suggestive conditions, 
not all children in the current study assented to and provided reports of the false 
activity. Unfortunately, there were no clear qualitative differences that enabled us to 
discriminate the reports of those children who did and did not assent, or to determine 
which children would provide false reports. This observation highlights the danger of 
using leading and coercive prompts when interviewing children and it reiterates the 
importance of encouraging interviewers to avoid these prompts in their practice. 
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Table 1. 
Full set of activities and associated target items. 
 
Plausibility 
(a) Plausible 
(b) Implausible 
 Item Suggested Items for 
False Activities 
Story 1 Name of the elephant Peter 
(a) Teacher reads  2 Where the elephant lives Jungle 
to rest of class 3 Animal the elephant marries Hippopotamus 
(b) Child reads to  4 Where gets married Hot air balloon 
rest of class 5 Where could not get job Hairdresser 
 6 What job gets Fireman 
 7 Where the story was from Rubbish bin 
 8 Where went on holiday Disney land 
 9 How pictures were held up Book 
 10 Who held the pictures Child A 
    
Special Friend 1 Name of the animal Boo 
(a) Koala  2 How brought Box 
puppet 3 Where Lisa met the animal Park 
(b) Real monkey 4 Where the animal sleeps Under the bed  
 5 Age of the animal One 
 6 Animal‟s best friend Kookaburra 
 7 Why the animal was sick Broken 
 8 Used to keep warm Jumper 
 9 Special for dinner Soup 
 10 Sticks purpose Cook marshmallows 
    
Surprise to take 
home 
1 What was the surprise in 
Lunchbox/Picnic 
basket 
(a) Sticker 2 Colour of surprise Yellow/Black 
(b) Real kittens 
3 
What was on the 
sticker/Kind of face kittens 
had 
Stars/Smiley 
 4 Child helped find stickers Child A 
 5 Where surprise was hidden Cupboard 
 6 Lisa‟s surprise Scarf/Blanket 
 7 Colour of Lisa‟s surprise Red 
 
8 
What had to do before 
surprise 
Jump up and down 
10 times 
 9 Left over surprise Brother Steve 
 10 Where surprise placed Chest 
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Table 2. 
Number and frequency of children who assented to the false activity across the event 
conditions and interviews. 
 
Event condition Order of interview 
 N First Second Third Fourth 
S plausible 26 10 (38%) 15 (58%) 13 (50%) 15 (58%) 
S implausible 24 10 (42%) 15 (63%) 13 (54%) 15 (63%) 
NS plausible 24  9 (38%) 14 (58%) 13 (54%) 13 (54%) 
NS implausible 25  8 (32%) 15 (60%) 17 (68%) 17 (68%) 
 
Note: S = Staged event, NS = No staged event 
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Table 3. 
Mean number of details
 a
 reported across the event conditions, questions and 
interviews. 
 
Event condition Open-ended questions Specific cued-recall questions 
 Order of interview Order of interview 
 Second Third Fourth Second Third Fourth 
Staged event 
plausible (N = 20)  
5.65 
(7.41) 
4.40 
(4.91) 
3.95 
(4.64) 
3.50 
(1.73) 
3.55 
(1.57) 
3.35 
(1.63) 
Staged event 
 implausible (N = 
17) 
6.65 
(5.28) 
8.82 
(10.52) 
9.18 
(8.62) 
3.59 
(1.62) 
3.59 
(1.80) 
3.71 
(1.65) 
No staged event 
plausible (N = 16) 
10.50 
(8.29) 
12.44 
(10.39) 
11.06 
(11.62) 
3.56 
(1.59) 
3.81 
(1.60) 
3.94 
(1.61) 
No staged event 
implausible (N = 18) 
11.94 
(8.97) 
12.83 
(8.67) 
15.44 
(13.66) 
3.67 
(1.61) 
4.17 
(1.62) 
3.89 
(1.75) 
 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
a
 Mean number of details in 
response to open-ended questions excludes fantastic/improbable details and 
contradictions which contained information that had already been coded under other 
categories. 
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Table 4.  
Mean number of details reported for each unit of information examined across the 
event conditions and interviews. 
 
Detail Second interview Third interview Fourth interview 
S plausible (N = 20)    
   Subjects 1.20 (1.58) 1.10 (1.12) 1.15 (1.31) 
   Objects 0.80 (1.24) 0.70 (1.08) 0.35 (0.59) 
   Actions 1.80 (2.29) 1.35 (1.90) 1.40 (1.64) 
   Temporal markers 0.50 (0.89) 0.20 (0.52) 0.15 (0.37) 
   Descriptives 0.60 (1.27) 0.40 (0.82) 0.65 (1.14) 
   Dialogue 0.00 (0.00) 0.05 (0.22) 0.00 (0.00) 
   Locations 0.75 (1.25) 0.60 (0.99) 0.25 (0.55) 
   Fantastic/improbable  0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
   Contradictions __________ 0.05 (0.22) 0.00 (0.00) 
S implausible (N = 17)  
   Subjects 1.94 (1.30) 1.59 (1.97) 2.06 (1.78) 
   Objects 1.12 (1.65) 1.65 (1.84) 1.47 (1.91) 
   Actions 2.24 (1.89) 2.94 (4.55) 3.24 (3.63) 
   Temporal markers 0.24 (0.56) 0.65 (1.32) 0.41 (0.87) 
   Descriptives 0.88 (0.93) 1.12 (2.18) 1.35 (1.90) 
   Dialogue 0.18 (0.53) 0.12 (0.49) 0.18 (0.53) 
   Locations 0.06 (0.24) 0.76 (1.20) 0.47 (0.72) 
   Fantastic/Improbable 0.00 (0.00) 0.53 (1.50) 0.24 (0.66) 
   Contradictions __________ 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
NS plausible (N = 16)  
   Subjects 3.06 (2.69) 2.81 (2.20) 2.25 (2.11) 
   Objects 1.75 (2.02) 2.38 (1.96) 2.13 (2.47) 
   Actions 3.13 (3.42) 3.94 (3.75) 3.50 (3.83) 
   Temporal/markers 0.88 (1.26) 0.63 (1.31) 0.63 (1.20) 
   Descriptives 1.00 (1.55) 1.56 (2.56) 1.56 (3.22) 
   Dialogue 0.06 (0.25) 0.06 (0.25) 0.19 (0.75) 
   Locations 0.63 (0.62) 1.06 (1.24) 0.81 (0.83) 
   Fantastic/improbable 0.00 (0.00) 0.50 (0.97) 0.38 (1.02) 
   Contradictions __________ 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
NS implausible (N = 18)  
   Subjects 2.44 (1.69) 3.17 (1.92) 2.67 (2.17) 
   Objects 1.61 (1.54) 1.67 (1.53) 2.44 (3.20) 
   Actions 4.83 (5.00) 4.61 (3.66) 6.17 (5.82) 
   Temporal markers 0.78 (0.81) 1.17 (1.58) 1.11 (1.45) 
   Descriptives 1.44 (1.58) 1.44 (1.54) 1.94 (2.01) 
   Dialogue 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 
   Locations 0.83 (0.86) 0.72 (1.02) 1.06 (1.30) 
   Fantastic/improbable 0.61 (1.50) 0.56 (1.15) 0.50 (0.86) 
   Contradictions __________ 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
 
Note: S = Staged event, NS = No staged event. Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses.
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Table 5.  
Mean proportion of errors reported across the event conditions, questions and interviews. 
 
 Open-ended questions Specific cued-recall questions 
Event condition Brought other 
activity 
Confabulation Interviewer 
suggestion 
Brought other 
activity 
Confabulation Interviewer 
suggestion 
 Second interview 
S  plausible (N = 20) .03 (.11) .62 (.38) .35 (.39) .08 (.12) .70 (.22) .22 (.19) 
S  implausible (N = 17) .12 (.26) .67 (.34) .21 (.30) .12 (.21) .68 (.31) .20 (.29) 
NS plausible (N = 16) ________ .86 (.25) .14 (.25) _______ .72 (.34) .28 (.34) 
NS Implausible (N = 18) ________ .85 (.13) .15 (.12) _______ .70 (.19) .30 (.19) 
 Third interview 
S plausible (N = 20) .11 (.25) .66 (.33) .23 (.26) .04 (.10) .75 (.28) .21 (.26) 
S implausible (N=17) .09 (.18) .71 (.28) .20 (.25) .06 (.12) .81 (.19) .13 (.20) 
NS plausible (N = 16) ________ .80 (.19) .20 (.24) _______ .70 (.27) .30 (.27) 
NS implausible (N = 18) ________ .74 (.25) .26 (.25) _______ .65 (.18) .35 (.18) 
 Fourth interview 
S plausible (N = 20) .15 (.25) .55 (.40) .30 (.39) .08 (.11) .72 (.29) .20 (.27) 
S implausible (N = 17) .20 (.33) .60 (.41) .20 (.33) .09 (.12) .74 (.25) .17 (.26) 
NS plausible (N = 16) ________ .77 (.30) .27 (.30) _______ .75 (.17) .25 (.17) 
NS implausible (N = 18) ________ .74 (.36) .26 (.36) _______ .73 (.24) .27 (.24) 
Note: S = Staged event, NS = No staged event. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  
